THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TAX COLLECTION

Abstract

The efficient collection of taxes stands as a cornerstone of modern economic systems, serving as a crucial mechanism for funding public services and redistributing wealth. This article delves into the theoretical underpinnings of tax collection, examining the interplay between economic principles, administrative strategies, and behavioral factors that influence the efficiency and effectiveness of tax systems. Drawing from a spectrum of economic theories, including the Benefit Theory, Ability-to-Pay Principle, and Optimal Tax Theory, we explore how these frameworks shape tax policy design. Furthermore, we investigate various administrative models of tax collection, highlighting the impact of technological advancements and organizational structures. The article also considers the insights offered by behavioral economics in understanding taxpayer compliance, emphasizing the role of incentives, penalties, and social norms. The synthesis of these perspectives provides a comprehensive understanding of tax collection, offering valuable insights for policymakers and tax authorities, while also identifying avenues for future research.